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We analyze the pace and patterns of job reallocation in Ukraine using 1992-2000 panel data 
on nearly the surviving universe of manufacturing firms inherited from the Soviet Union.  
Employment growth displays substantial increase in heterogeneity during this transition 
period, with a corresponding rise in excess job reallocation.  Unlike data for Soviet Russia in 
the 1980s, Ukrainian job reallocation in the 1990s was clearly productivity-enhancing, both 
within and across industries.  The paper also estimates the effects of firm and market 
characteristics on the magnitude of reallocation and on the extent to which it has contributed 
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1.  Introduction 
  Although much has been written about the important role played by labor reallocation 
in the transition of the post-socialist economies, there are relatively few analytical studies of 
the degree to which labor markets have been successful in facilitating the movement of 
workers from less productive to more productive activities.  This lack of analysis may partly 
be due to the fact that the attention of economists studying labor markets in transition has 
tended to be dominated by a two-sector model in which labor gradually shifts from state-
owned to privately owned firms and in which within-sector homogeneity is assumed.
1  
Essentially, a representative state-owned (industrial) enterprise destroys jobs and a 
representative privately owned (service sector) firm creates them. 
While a reasonable simplification for some purposes, this representative firm model 
omits much of the interesting heterogeneity within sectors.  Moreover, on closer examination, 
actual labor flows appear to be largely inconsistent with it, as turnover of jobs and workers is 
much larger than required merely for flows from state to private ownership or from 
manufacturing to service industries—although these flows are nontrivial.  More 
disaggregated studies, using microdata, have documented substantial labor mobility within 
these sectors.
2  Furthermore, it has become plain that broad sectors mask substantial variation 
in firm performance, restructuring, and productivity.  If the labor market is supposed to be 
functioning to reallocate labor from less to more productive uses, then the focus on aggregate 
sectors may be somewhat misplaced. 
                                                 
1 This view is characteristic of the so-called “optimal speed of transition” literature.  See, for instance, 
Aghion and Blanchard (1994). 
2 See, e.g., Boeri (2000).  Studies of worker flows in transition economies include Brown and Earle (2003), 
Earle (1997), Earle and Sabirianova (2001), Kapeliushnikov (1997), Layard and Richter (1995), Lehmann 
and Wadsworth (2000), Munich, Terrell, and Svejnar (2002), and Sabirianova (2002).  Studies of job flows 
include Acquisti and Lehmann (2000), Bilsen and Konings (1998), Brown and Earle (2002, 2004), Faggio 
and Konings (1999), Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002), Jurajda and Terrell (2001), and Konings, 
Lehmann and Schaffer (1996).   3
In this paper, we argue that an evaluation of the extent to which labor markets in 
transition economies have begun to successfully perform this function requires detailed 
microdata at the firm level and a methodology for connecting labor flows with productivity 
performance.  Drawing upon measurement methods introduced by Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1992, 1999), we describe the magnitudes and patterns of job reallocation in Ukraine, and the 
relationship of the observed job flows with a measure of firm productivity.  Our focus on job 
rather than worker flows is dictated by limitations of our data, but it is also more 
straightforward to relate firm-level productivity with firm-level employment, rather than with 
worker mobility.  Our purpose in examining Ukraine is to extend our recent analysis of 
Russia (Brown and Earle, 2002) to a large transition country, albeit one that has been 
somewhat neglected by transition research.  While the starting point of the transition process 
was quite similar in both cases, given the common Soviet heritage, the choice of policies 
thereafter was quite different, with Ukraine by most accounts following a more “gradualist” 
path of slower liberalization, privatization, and stabilization than its larger neighbor.  Is the 
gradualist policy reflected in a slower or faster pace of job reallocation and a better or worse 
functioning of the labor market, in the sense of the correlation of job flows with productivity?  
Are the patterns of job flows becoming more similar to those observed in the West (for 
instance, as reported by Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992 and 1999), and how do those patterns 
compare with those in Russia?  These are the main questions around which we organize our 
analysis. 
The paper’s focus is restricted to firms operating in the manufacturing sector.  Again, 
this focus is dictated by constraints of available data, but the size of this sector, its importance 
to the Ukrainian economy in the Soviet period, and the particular difficulties of restructuring 
suggest that it is also a worthwhile subject for study.  The data we employ do have the 
advantages of a fairly long time series—annual from 1992 to 2000—and they are quite   4
comparable in scope and variable definitions to those in our Russia study.
3  We should 
emphasize, however, that the data permit no inferences to be drawn concerning entry, exit, 
and the new private firm sector, which is likely to be an important source of growing labor 
demand and job creation.
4 
In Ukraine as in Russia, it is clear even from aggregate statistics that job destruction 
has dominated job creation in the industrial sector.  Figure 1 shows the evolution of 
employment over the 1992–2000 period, including a remarkable fall of nearly 40 percent by 
1999, followed by a small increase in 2000.
5  Although large by any standard, the 
employment drop was nonetheless substantially exceeded by the fall in output to less than 50 
percent of its initial level. 
These patterns may be unsurprising to anyone familiar with recent developments in 
the East European region, but little is known about the character of this massive job 
destruction in the industrial sector.  Does it represent a process of creative destruction, 
whereby the least efficient firms downsize and eventually disappear, while the more efficient 
grow?  Or does it represent severe recession, in firms have been hit by a common negative 
shock?  A final possibility is that the job destruction is concentrated among the better, more 
efficient firms in industry, suggesting “sclerosis” in the sense of Caballero and Hammour 
(2000), whereby unproductive firms survive due to market imperfections and government 
policies.  In Ukraine, as in Russia, there may be particularly compelling reasons to suspect 
                                                 
3 The comparison to our research on Russia is also useful because in that study (Brown and Earle, 2002) 
we were able to analyze annual data back to 1985 and thus could trace out longer term changes from the 
pre-perestroika Soviet period into the transition.  Given that Ukraine was governed by the same economic 
and political regime as Russia, the 1985–91 behavior for Ukraine is unlikely to differ substantially from 
Russia, although unfortunately the earlier Ukrainian data are not available for analysis. 
4 The Ukrainian Statistical Office (Derzhkomstat) industrial registry that we employ contains 94.1 and 85.2 
percent of total industrial employment in 1992 and 2000, respectively. We do not know the precise criteria 
for inclusion in the registry, but judging by the low number of entrants, we suspect that it does not include 
new firms below a certain size.  Analysis of entry and exit would require great efforts to establish missing 
longitudinal links in the data; we are presently carrying out this research, but in this paper are able to report 
job flows for continuing firms only. 
5 These figures refer to annual average levels of employment, as do the variables in the enterprise data set 
available to us.    5
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some sclerotic forces at work, as the government may have directly subsidized or otherwise 
supported weak and failing firms while taxes, bureaucratic interference, and poor contract 
enforcement and property rights protection may have retarded the growth of firms that are 
more successful.  The view that the economic transition has destroyed the better, more 
productive parts of the industrial sector is far from uncommon in Ukraine and other transition 
economies, although it is usually associated with nostalgia for the Soviet period.  In this 
paper, we provide evidence on the character of resource reallocation by relating job flows to 
firm-level productivity measures. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a basic description 
of the magnitudes, heterogeneity, and covariates of job flows, including their relationships 
with ownership, market concentration, exports, capital intensity, wages, labor productivity, 
and employment size.  Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), our method is to estimate 
the impact of these factors on employment growth and job reallocation in a regression 
framework, and we then compute the partial coefficients measuring their effects on excess 
job reallocation using simulation methods.  To assess whether the job flow patterns have 
changed over our observation period of 1992–2000—that is, whether they are moving in the   6
direction of patterns characteristic of market economies—we interact the covariates with a 
time trend in these regressions and simulations.  Section 3 relates the job flows to 
productivity differentials across firms and industries.  We employ decomposition techniques 
drawn from Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) to 
measure the contribution of job flows to sectoral and aggregate productivity growth, and we 
also apply regression techniques to assess the statistical significance of the employment share 
growth-productivity differential relationship and to estimate the effects of firm characteristics 
on this relationship.  We are particularly interested in assessing whether we can find evidence 
for any effects of privatization and liberalization policies on this aspect of restructuring.   
Section 4 provides a brief conclusion.  The data sources and variable definitions are described 
in an appendix. 
2.  Job Flows in Ukraine 
We begin by reporting our calculations of job flows, following the definitions of 
Davis and Haltiwanger (1992, 1999), except for the fact that—as noted above—we focus on 
continuing firms and omit flows associated with firm entry and exit.  As shown in Table 1, 
net employment growth is negative every year from 1992 to 2000, with the largest declines in 
the mid-1990s and the smallest in 1999–2000, the only year of substantial growth in 
industrial production since the breakup of the Soviet Union.
6  The creation rate was 
negligible at the beginning of the 1990s, but it had risen substantially by the final year of the 
decade.  The destruction rate is less trended, following the inverse U-shape of net 
employment change, with the highest rates in the 1993–1997 period and falling off slightly in 
                                                 
6 The official statistics on aggregate industrial employment (in Figure 1) imply employment growth from 
1999 to 2000, but these include estimates of employment in new small firms and incorporate other expert 
opinions of the State Statistical Committee. 
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the later years.  Job reallocation is fairly constant at about 12 percent after the first year, 
while excess job reallocation rises steadily and gradually. 
In broad terms, this pattern is fairly similar to that of Russia, as we described in 
Brown and Earle (2002).  The numbers for the first year of the Ukrainian data are very 
similar to the corresponding figures for Russia in the same year.  But the subsequent rises in 
the job creation rate and particularly in the destruction rate are more abrupt in Russia, for 
instance reaching a 14.5 percent destruction rate in 1993–94 and a 3.3 percent creation rate 
by 1995–96.  The excess job reallocation rate in Russia was already 6.5 percent in 1995–96, 
more than double the Ukrainian rate that year.  The data, therefore, do appear to be fairly 
consistent with the usual picture of a more rapidly reforming Russia—which adopted a 
“shock therapy” program of liberalization and stabilization in January 1992 and one of the 
most rapid privatization programs the world has ever seen from late 1992 to 1994—while 
Ukraine moved more slowly.  Even if the Russian program contained many missteps, or even 
steps backwards, the data suggest that the policies may indeed have had consequences for 
restructuring. 
Table 2 documents the persistence of the job flows, i.e., the extent to which jobs 
added or subtracted from the firm remain gained or lost in future years.  They are highly 
Table 1 




















1992-93 1.1  8.3  9.4  -7.2  2.1  6,759 
1993-94 1.2  11.6  12.7 -10.4  2.3  7,410 
1994-95 1.3  11.1  12.4  -9.8  2.6  7,449 
1995-96 1.6  11.2  12.7  -9.6  3.1  7,574 
1996-97 1.6  11.2  12.8  -9.7  3.2  7,781 
1997-98 1.7  10.0  11.7  -8.3  3.4  6,946 
1998-99 2.4  10.1  12.5  -7.7  4.9  7,866 
1999-00 3.4  8.6  12.0  -5.2  6.8  6,530 
Average 1.8  10.3  12.0  -8.5  3.6 7,289 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
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persistent, especially destruction.  Persistence is slightly higher than in Russia and also higher 
than in the U.S.  So most job flows in Ukraine are not temporary phenomena. 
 
Heterogeneity of employment growth rates across firms is a distinctive feature of a 
market economy.  Table 3 shows that growth rates became more heterogeneous each year 
through 1999.  Though employment declines in over half the firms each year, an increasing 
proportion enjoy employment gains.  Compared to Russia, Ukrainian employment change 
was initially more homogeneous, and the standard deviation does not surpass Russia’s 1993–
94 level of heterogeneity until 1997–98.  The 1998–99 standard deviation for the two 
countries is virtually identical, however.  In sum, by this measure Ukraine moved in the 
direction of a market economy at a slower rate than Russia, but it caught up by 1998-99. 
 
Table 2 







Creation 70.0  45.7 
Destruction 96.0  92.2 
Reallocation 92.8  86.7 
*The 2-year creation persistence in the second period is 
the 1992–98 average. 
 
Table 3 
Distribution of Year-by-Year Employment Growth Rates (by %) 
 
  5  10 25 50 75 90 95  Mean  SD 
1992-93 -27.0  -20.5 -12.1 -5.2 0.0  5.4  10.5  -6.5  14.2
1993-94 -33.3  -25.3 -15.8 -7.4 0.0  4.5  9.4  -8.7  16.3
1994-95 -33.8  -25.9 -15.2 -6.4 0.0  6.4  11.4  -8.0  16.8
1995-96 -38.9  -28.2 -16.5 -7.1 0.0  6.1  11.5  -9.4  19.9
1996-97 -40.5  -28.6 -16.3 -8.0 -0.2  6.3  13.8  -9.6  21.6
1997-98 -39.7  -28.1 -14.9 -6.2 0.2  8.9  19.9  -7.5  24.0
1998-99 -52.9  -33.4 -16.9 -6.5 1.2  12.7  27.7  -8.5  29.5
1999-00 -54.0  -34.5 -16.8 -5.4 3.2  13.5  23.6  -8.7  26.2
1992-00 -40.0  -28.1 -15.6 -6.5 0.6  8.0  16.0  -8.4  21.1  9
Job flow rates vary considerably across sectors, as shown in Table 4.  The average job 
creation rate is actually higher than the destruction rate in the electricity sector, while 
machine building’s destruction rate is 11.5 times larger than the creation rate.  The patterns 
are very similar to those in Russia. 
Table 4  
Average Annual Job Flows by Sector, 1992–2000 
 
 Creation  Destruction 
All Industry  2.0  9.4 
Electricity 3.8  2.2 
Fuel 2.3  7.2 
Ferrous Metallurgy  2.4  3.2 
Non-Ferrous Metallurgy  3.4  6.1 
Chemicals 1.3  9.2 
Machine-Building 1.1  12.7 
Forestry 2.1  11.0 
Construction Materials  1.5  10.0 
Light   1.5  12.4 
Food Processing  3.1  6.3 
 
Davis and Haltiwanger (1992, 1999) and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) 
describe the variation in job flows in the U.S. by a number of employer characteristics, 
including size, capital intensity, export orientation, average wage, and labor productivity, 
among others.  In this section, we conduct a similar analysis, adding to this list of variables 
ownership (state versus nonstate) and product and labor market concentration.  These latter 
factors are particularly interesting in the transition setting, as they represent the outcomes of 
policies of privatization and liberalization; thus, we are interested in how those policies have 
affected job flows. 
Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), and in order to present the results more 
compactly, examine the robustness of the relationships when controlling for other factors, and 
assess the statistical significance of our findings, we report regressions where firm growth 
and absolute value of growth (reallocation) are dependent variables and these characteristics 
are included as independent variables; the impact of reforms is assessed by including  10
interaction terms with a time trend.  We calculate excess job reallocation coefficients from 
simulations of the impact of a one standard deviation change around the mean in each 
continuous independent variable (or a change from 0 to 1 in the case of a dummy) on the 
predicted excess reallocation rate, where all other variables are permitted to take their true 
values (unlike Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999), who condition on the median values of all other 
variables).  The excess reallocation simulations with the time trend interactions are 
conditioned on Time=7 (1999–2000) and the main effects having the same values as in the 
interaction term.  
Taking the example of ownership, we estimate predicted excess reallocation for 
nonstate ownership using equation (1), where  iNS e ˆ   is predicted excess reallocation for 
nonstate firms,  iNS r ˆ  is predicted reallocation, α  is a constant,  NS β   is the coefficient for 
nonstate ownership,  j β  is a vector of coefficients on the other independent variables,  i X  is 
a matrix of firm i’s true values for the other independent variables, and  iNS g ˆ  is predicted 
employment growth.   
( ) ( ) ( ) i j NS iNS i j NS iNS iNS X g abs X r e β β α β β α + + − + + = ˆ ˆ ˆ .        (1) 
Then we estimate predicted excess reallocation for state ownership using equation (2). 
( ) ( ) ( ) i j iS i j iS iS X g abs X r e β α β α + − + = ˆ ˆ ˆ .               (2) 
The only difference from equation (1) is that  NS β   drops out.  The excess reallocation 
















                                 (3) 
measuring the marginal effect of nonstate ownership on excess job reallocation.     11
We also control for fixed industry-territory effects.  Given that, again following Davis 
and Haltiwanger (1999), the firm characteristics are held constant over the entire period, the 
coefficients on these variables represent their impacts on job flows at the beginning of the 
reform period, while the coefficient on the interaction terms of characteristics with the time 
dummy then measures the additional impact post-reform.  Table 5 contains the results from 
estimating these equations, as well as the calculations of excess job reallocation coefficients. 
We start by examining firm size.  A key finding in Western studies (Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1992) is that size is negatively associated with all types of job flows.  In the 
Table 5 







Nonstate  -0.008   (-0.67)  -0.022   (-1.27) -0.029 
Product Market Concentration  0.015    (0.64)  0.026    (0.88) 0.003 
Export  -0.041   (-4.68)  0.035    (1.96) -0.003 
Labor Market Concentration  0.062    (2.17)  -0.041   (-1.29) 0.002 
Average Capital Intensity  -0.097   (-5.70)  0.076    (4.18) -0.004 
Average Wage  0.006    (0.26)  0.001    (0.04) 0.002 
Average Labor Productivity  0.128    (4.58)  -0.114   (-3.22) 0.007 
Average Employment  0.001    (0.32)  -0.003   (-0.36) -0.002 
Nonstate*Time  0.001    (0.29)  0.001    (0.29) 0.016 
Product Mkt. 
Concentration*Time 
-0.008   (-1.52)  -0.002   (-0.32) -0.011 
Export*Time  0.023    (8.29)  -0.021   (-3.92) -0.081 
Labor Mkt. 
Concentration*Time 
-0.004   (-0.47)  -0.003   (-0.33) -0.005 
Average Capital Intensity*Time  -0.005   (-1.14)  0.004    (0.96) -0.000 
Average Wage*Time  0.008    (1.24)  -0.006   (-0.85) 0.003 
Average Labor 
Productivity*Time 
-0.000   (-0.00)  -0.008   (-1.03) -0.014 
Average Employment*Time  -0.001   (-1.28)  0.002    (1.05) 0.013 
Time  -0.014   (-2.13)  0.017    (2.85) 0.032 
Constant  -0.072   (-2.76)  0.176  (13.21)  
Adjusted R
2  0.119 0.163   
N 39,379  39,379   
Note: t statistics are in parentheses, using standard errors corrected for clustering on firm identifier.  
The regressions are weighted by employment, and they include fixed industry-territory effects.  The 
dependent variable in the reallocation regression is the absolute value of employment growth.  Time is 
a time trend ranging from 0 in 1993 to 7 in 2000.  12
transition context, large firms emerging from the central planning system may be more likely 
to require downsizing, but they also face higher political opposition to reducing employment, 
so the expected relationship between job destruction and size is ambiguous.  The employment 
growth regressions show no statistically significant relationship between size and 
employment growth and reallocation.  Excess reallocation is higher in small firms, as in the 
U.S., but surprisingly this difference narrowed over time.  This contrasts with Russia, which 
shows relationships more like the U.S.—higher flows of all types among small firms. 
The ownership dimension is particularly interesting in transition economies, as it 
represents the outcome, to a considerable extent, of explicit privatization policies intended to 
facilitate enterprise restructuring through improved corporate governance.  In Ukraine the 
privatization process spread throughout the 1990s, in contrast to Russia, where three-quarters 
of industrial firms were privatized by July 1994.  Unfortunately, our data do not contain the 
privatization date, so all firms privatized by 1998 are considered to be nonstate during the 
entire period.  Almost none of the firms were privatized by 1993, so the coefficient on 
nonstate captures the pre-privatization relationship with job flows for those firms that later 
became privatized.  This allows us to detect selection bias in the nature of ownership change.  
  We find no statistically significant difference in employment growth or reallocation 
between state and nonstate firms either preceding or following privatization.  Excess 
reallocation, though, is estimated to have been lower for firms to be privatized prior to 
privatization, but higher after privatization relative to firms that remain state owned.  This is 
consistent with privatization leading to greater restructuring.   
  Competition could also pressure firms to restructure, in which case one would expect 
to see a greater increase in job creation and destruction among firms facing more competition 
once markets are liberalized.  To investigate this issue, we employ three measures of 
exposure to competition, including domestic product market concentration, exporting, and  13
labor market concentration.  Starting with domestic product market concentration, our 
measure follows Brown and Earle (2002) in order to take into account different geographic 
market sizes across industries.  We use data at two geographic levels:  national and regional.  
Our argument is that the geographic scope of the market in an industry is reflected in the 
degree to which producers in the industry are located across different regions of the country.  
For instance, an industry with member firms in all regions is likely to be characterized by 
regional markets, and an industry with firms in only a few regions is likely to be a national 
market.  To implement a mixed concentration measure, we calculated the HHI in 1992 for 
each industry at each geographic level (RegConcij for the regional HHI of firm i in 5-digit 
industry j and NatConcij for the national HHI) and combined them into a single index as 
follows: 
 Concij = RegPropj*RegConcij + (1 – RegPropj)*NatConcij, (4) 
where RegPropj refers to the proportion of regions with at least one firm in industry j.  We 
employ dummies for exporters in 1998, 1999, or 2000, the only years for which we have 
export information.  Finally, we calculate a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for 1993 industrial 
employment concentration in each county (raion).   
The regressions show no differences for employment growth or reallocation in 
relation to product market concentration.  Excess reallocation was initially higher in 
concentrated product markets, but the relationship reverses over time.  So perhaps domestic 
product market competition developed and began to have an effect as reforms were 
implemented.   
Exporting shows a strong association with job flows.  Exporting was initially 
associated with less growth and more reallocation, but this reverses during the period.   
Exporters thus seem to have downsized earlier than other firms.  Exporting was associated 
with less excess reallocation, especially in later years.  14
Firms in less concentrated labor markets appear to have downsized more than others, 
as shown by the positive coefficient for labor concentration in the employment growth 
regression.  Labor concentration was initially associated with greater excess reallocation, but 
this reverses over time, as would be expected with liberalization.  
 
  Firms with greater fixed costs of labor turnover, for instance due to higher hiring costs 
or more firm-specific human capital, should have a stronger incentive to hoard labor and may 
exhibit lower rates of job creation and destruction.  This proposition has been the motivation 
for studies of job flows to examine their relationship with several firm characteristics that 
may be associated with turnover costs, namely capital intensity, average wages (in the post-
reform period), and average labor productivity.  A second motivation for examining capital 
intensity in the Ukrainian context is that investment levels have been extremely low during 
the transition due to the poor investment climate.  Thus, capital-intensive firms may have 
been forced to downsize more than others because of a greater need for investment to 
continue operating.   
Capital intensity is associated with less growth and more reallocation, consistent with 
the poor investment climate hypothesis.  Excess reallocation is lower in capital-intensive 
firms, which together with the employment growth results suggests that few capital-intensive 
firms are creating jobs.  Wages are increasingly associated with excess reallocation, contrary 
to the firm-specific human capital hypothesis.  As in Russia, we suspect that the increase 
reflects the abrupt demand shifts and large labor mobility costs:  firms creating jobs are 
forced to pay higher wages to attract workers. 
Labor productivity is positively associated with growth and negatively associated with 
reallocation, as in Russia.  This is a first indication of a positive association between 
reallocation and productivity growth.  Labor productivity is initially positively associated 
with excess reallocation, but then it becomes negative. So the results relating to the firm- 15
specific human capital hypothesis are quite mixed, as we found in Russia.  The positive 
association between labor productivity and growth suggests a relationship between 
reallocation and productivity growth, which we will examine further in the next section.  
3.  Job Reallocation and Productivity Growth 
The discussion so far has documented the magnitude, covariates, and changes in job 
flows during the course of reforms.  But how do job flows, particularly the increased pace of 
job destruction in the old manufacturing sector, relate to productivity?  Has the downsizing 
process been creative, in the sense of contributing to productivity growth by eliminating less 
productive jobs?  Or would it better be characterized as neutral with respect to productivity, 
or even as destructive, resulting in the elimination of the more productive jobs in the 
Ukrainian economy?  Has the implied productivity impact of job reallocation changed as 
reforms have been implemented?  Does the productivity relationship vary with observable 
characteristics of firms, including measures of ownership, market competition, capital 
intensity and wage level, and how have these patterns changed? 
This section addresses these questions by building on decomposition methods 
proposed by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) and others.  Our extensions are twofold.  
First, our decompositions include both an intermediate decomposition of industry 
productivity into its components and an aggregation of the cross-industry relationships to 
total manufacturing sector productivity.  By contrast, Foster et al. report only the cross-
industry averages of the within-industry relationship of employment growth and productivity.  
An argument against our extension of the analysis to aggregate productivity is that 
measurement constraints, chiefly the availability of only gross output rather than value-added 
in the data and the absence of disaggregated deflators, create problems in interpreting the 
cross-industry job flows-productivity relationship.  We believe that the considerable interest  16
in accounting for aggregate productivity dynamics outweighs these problems, but they should 
be borne in mind when interpreting the results below. 
Our second methodological extension moves beyond the simple decompositions to 
investigate the statistical significance of the relationships implied by the decomposition terms 
(for instance, the covariance of productivity level and employment growth) and to estimate 
the association of these relationships with firm characteristics, particularly privatization and 
competition and how these may have changed in the post-reform period.  It is of particular 
interest to examine whether ownership and competition measures are associated with the 
degree to which the flows appear to enhance productivity. 
We first describe the decomposition methodology and then report results.  We use a 
decomposition analogous to Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan’s (2001) method 2, according to 
which aggregate productivity change, ∆Pt, can be decomposed as follows: 




i ei eit i
ie
ei eit i t P P S P P S S S P S P                              (5) 
where S is the weight (share) of a firm or industry, t indexes years, i indexes industries, and e 
indexes enterprises within industries, so that Pit is average productivity of sector i in year t, 
Peit is the productivity of enterprise e in sector i in year t.  The bars over the variables refer to 
averages of year t-1 and t.  The first term is the “within firm” effect, the second term 
measures intra-sectoral compositional change, and the third term measures inter-sectoral 
compositional change.  Relative to a method that includes a cross term between productivity 
change and employment share change, this method has the disadvantage that within and 
between effects are to some extent confounded.  This method is less subject to measurement 
error, however, a potentially important consideration when using data from Ukraine.    17
  Following Olley and Pakes (1996), we also conduct a cross-sectional decomposition 
of labor productivity: 
  ( )( ) ∑ − − + =
e
i et i et i it P P S S P P .                                                              (6)  
We then take the weighted average by employment of each industry’s decomposition.  The 
first term is the unweighted average of productivity, and the second term shows whether 
activity is disproportionately located in high productivity (if the term is positive) or low 
productivity (if the term is negative) firms.  When examining the time series pattern, we can 
see whether the allocation of activity has become more or less productivity-enhancing over 
time.  This method has two main advantages:  differences in productivity cross-sectionally 
are more persistent and less affected by measurement error and transitory shocks, and we are 
able to include entering and exiting firms in addition to continuing firms.  
The results from carrying out these decompositions where productivity is measured as 
average labor productivity (the output-employment ratio) and firms and industries are 
weighted by employment shares are shown in Tables 6 and 7. 
Within-firm productivity change was the dominant component in the early 1990s, reflecting a 
common negative productivity shock early in the transition.  As in Russia and the U.S., this 
component was highly pro-cyclical.  Both intersectoral and intrasectoral reallocation had 
Table 6 









1992-93 -0.063  0.005  0.013 -0.045 
1993-94 -0.441  0.010  0.037 -0.395 
1994-95 -0.227  0.013  0.062 -0.152 
1995-96 -0.209  0.019  0.064 -0.125 
1996-97 -0.066  0.015  0.039 -0.012 
1997-98 -0.095  0.027  0.032 -0.036 
1998-99 -0.054  0.032  0.024  0.002 
1999-00 0.057  0.041  0.043 0.142 
1992-00 -0.909  0.091  0.402 -0.417 
1992-00 -0.137  0.020  0.039 -0.078  18
positive effects on productivity growth throughout the period, partially counteracting the 
negative within-firm productivity decline. Intersectoral reallocation increased soon after 
reforms began, while intrasectoral reallocation was slower to appear.  By 1997–98, though, 
intrasectoral reallocation had become as important as intersectoral reallocation to productivity 
growth, and they each had nearly as large an effect on productivity growth as within-firm 
change.  The main differences with the Russian results are that intrasectoral reallocation 
became an important contributor to productivity growth at an earlier point in the transition in 
Russia, and Russian intersectoral reallocation became less important in the late 1990s while it 
remained important (though declining somewhat too) in Ukraine.  
 
The cross-sectional decomposition in Table 7 shows that employment was fairly 
evenly spread among more and less productive firms in the early reform years.  In 1996 
employment became much more concentrated in more productive firms, and it remained so 
through 2000.  In the late 1990s employment concentration in higher productivity firms was 
significantly greater than in Russia.  
We next examine whether the estimated relationships between the employment share 
growth and productivity differentials are statistically significant, using the set of OLS and 
firm-fixed effects regressions shown in Tables 8 (unweighted) and 9 (weighted by employ- 
Table 7 














1992 6.332 6.201  0.131  0.021 
1993 2.820 2.646  0.175  0.062 
1994 4.764 4.585  0.179  0.038 
1995 6.121 5.935  0.186  0.030 
1996 1.819 1.561  0.258  0.142 
1997 1.877 1.557  0.320  0.170 
1998 1.997 1.680  0.317  0.159 
1999 2.308 1.902  0.405  0.175 
2000 2.772 2.358  0.414  0.149  19
 
Table 8 































PD    0.061     (6.49)  0.104    (7.04)  0.020    (5.38)  0.006    (2.57) 
PD*Time    0.004     (1.72)  -0.004   (-1.35)  -0.001   (-1.61)  -0.001   (-2.23) 
Time  0.024   (22.60)  0.017   (15.71)  -0.008    (-3.16)  -0.009   (-4.64)  0.001    (1.02)  0.000    (0.15) 
Constant  -0.241  (-56.45)  -0.219  (-51.60)  0.020     (2.86)  0.025    (3.35)  -0.002   (-1.01)  -0.000   (-0.14) 
R
2  0.014 0.014 0.007 0.006 0.085 0.069 
N  35,406 35,406 35,406 35,406  2,005  2,005 
Note:  t statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors in the OLS specifications are adjusted for clustering on the firm in the firm regressions and on the industry 
in the industry regression.  PD is the lagged difference in productivity between the firm and the average for the industry in the third and fourth columns, and the difference in 





Reallocation Productivity Regressions (Employment-Weighted) 
 





















PD    0.157     (4.15)  0.260    (8.25)  0.070    (5.22)  -0.001   (-0.25) 
PD*Time    0.019     (1.90)  -0.001   (-0.17)  0.005    (0.53)  0.005    (5.93) 
Time  0.036   (17.91)  0.031   (31.66)  -0.029    (-2.28)  -0.030   (-8.60)  0.012    (1.63)  0.005    (6.10) 
Constant  -0.257  (-32.02)  -0.239  (-60.97)  0.118     (2.96)  0.118    (8.53)  -0.020   (-1.79)  0.006    (1.93) 
R
2  0.038 0.056 0.015 0.066 0.340 0.745 
N  35,406 35,406 35,406 35,406  2,005  2,005 
Note:  t statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors in the OLS specifications are adjusted for clustering on the firm in the firm regressions and on the industry 
in the industry regression.  PD is the lagged difference in productivity between the firm and the average for the industry in the third and fourth columns, and the difference in 




ment).  The within effect (average firm productivity growth) is negative initially but increases 
at a highly significant rate, becoming positive by the end of the period, as shown in the first 
two regressions.  In the next two regressions we break the intrasectoral reallocation term into 
its two components, making the firm employment share of its industry growth the dependent 
variable and the productivity difference between the firm and the average for the industry 
(PD), the independent variable.  PD is lagged to avoid simultaneity bias with the dependent 
variable.  We find that the coefficient on the productivity difference is positive and highly 
statistically significant, but the trend over time is unclear, as it is positive in the OLS 
specification and negative but insignificant when adding fixed effects. 
The last two regressions analogously break the intersectoral effect into its two 
components: industry employment share growth on the left-hand side, and the lagged 
productivity difference between the industry and all manufacturing on the right-hand side.  In 
the unweighted regressions the productivity difference is positive but declining over time.  
The productivity difference is positive and untrended in the weighted OLS regression, while 
it is insignificant at the beginning of reform and increasingly positive over time once adding 
fixed effects.  Thus, each of the components of labor productivity growth is statistically 
significant, but the trends on the effect of intra- and intersectoral reallocation on productivity 
growth are ambiguous. 
A final question concerns covariates of the relationship between intrasectoral 
productivity differences and intrasectoral firm employment share.  Of particular interest is the 
possibility that good corporate governance and effective market competition encourage less 
productive  firms to contract relative to more productive ones in an industry:  have 
privatization and competition strengthened the productivity-enhancing effect of job 
reallocation?    22
Our approach to analyzing this issue relies on OLS and fixed effects regressions of the 
growth in a firm’s industry employment share on PD, the interactions of PD with the time 
trend and with firm characteristics, and three-way interactions of PD, the time trend, and firm 
characteristics.  As before, firm characteristics are held fixed throughout the period, so that 
the estimated coefficients on the three-way interactions measure the increased impact of firm 
characteristics later in the transition on the strength of the relationship between PD and 
growth in the firm’s industry employment share.  With respect to the non-state dummy, for 
instance, the coefficient on the interaction with PD measures the early transition relationship 
of employment growth and PD for firms that subsequently became non-state (i.e., firms that 
were subsequently privatized), while the coefficient on the three-way interaction measures 
the change that occurred after reforms were actually adopted (i.e., after firms were actually 
privatized). 
The results of OLS and fixed-effects estimation of this equation are displayed in 
Tables 10 (unweighted) and 11 (weighted by employment).  The effect of ownership change 
on the intensity of the employment growth-PD relationship varies widely across the 
specifications.  In the unweighted OLS specification the relationship was stronger in firms to 
be privatized, but it weakened once they were privatized.  There was no difference in the 
employment growth–PD relationship between firms to be privatized and those to remain 
state, but it became stronger over time for privatized firms in the weighted fixed-effects 
specification.  
As for the effect of market competition, product market concentration actually 
intensified the relationship in the early reform years, but that changed as time went on, 
consistent with domestic competition beginning to discipline less productive firms to 
restructure. Exporting, which exposes firms to competition in foreign markets, was associated  
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Table 10 
Between-Firm Reallocation Productivity Regressions 
 
 Percentage  Firm 
Employment Share Growth 
(OLS) 
Percentage Firm 
Employment Share Growth 
(Fixed Effects) 
PD  -0.274     (-3.38)  -0.314     (-3.08) 
PD*Nonstate  0.065      (2.44)  0.024      (0.63) 
PD*Conc.  0.181      (3.69)  0.195      (2.91) 
PD*Export  0.083      (3.30)  0.082      (2.18) 
PD*LaborConc.  -0.029     (-0.46)  -0.114     (-1.01) 
PD*Capital  0.097      (2.97)  0.083      (1.44) 
PD*Wage  -0.027     (-0.81)  -0.033     (-0.55) 
PD*Emp.  0.028      (2.23)  0.057      (3.55) 
PD*Time  -0.025     (-1.20)  -0.005     (-0.25) 
PD*Nonstate*Time  -0.013     (-2.01)  -0.008     (-1.10) 
PD*Conc.*Time  -0.018     (-1.60)  -0.028     (-2.19) 
PD*Export*Time  -0.007     (-1.14)  -0.002     (-0.31) 
PD*LaborConc.*Time  0.024      (1.38)  0.024      (1.13) 
PD*Capital*Time  -0.008     (-0.91)  -0.013     (-1.21) 
PD*Wage*Time  0.035      (3.95)  0.039      (3.51) 
PD*Emp.*Time  0.006      (1.88)  0.000      (0.13) 
Nonstate  -0.017     (-0.88)   
Conc.  0.101      (2.43)   
Export  -0.035     (-1.98)   
LaborConc.  0.052      (1.12)   
Capital  -0.112     (-4.50)   
Wage  0.095      (2.97)   
Emp.  0.045      (4.23)   
Nonstate*Time  -0.008     (-1.37)  -0.010      (-1.89) 
Conc.*Time  -0.039     (-2.54)  -0.045      (-4.87) 
Export*Time  0.011      (2.23)  0.012       (2.49) 
LaborConc.*Time  0.026      (1.51)  0.025       (1.73) 
Capital*Time  0.007      (0.79)  0.004       (0.48) 
Wage*Time  -0.004     (-0.36)  0.001       (0.07) 
Emp.*Time  -0.012     (-3.36)  -0.012      (-6.08) 
Time  0.057      (2.40)  0.061       (4.68) 
Constant  -0.228     (-3.41)  0.019       (2.21) 
R
2  0.019 0.015 
N 35,406  35,406 
Note:  t statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for firm clustering in the OLS specification. 
is the lagged difference in productivity between the firm and the average for the industry.  Time is a time tr






Between-Firm Reallocation Productivity Regressions (Employment-Weighted) 
 
 Percentage  Firm 
Employment Share Growth 
(OLS) 
Percentage Firm 
Employment Share Growth 
(Fixed Effects) 
PD  -0.578     (-1.82)  -0.776     (-3.75) 
PD*Nonstate  0.054      (0.58)  -0.106     (-1.31) 
PD*Conc.  0.513      (2.60)  0.546      (3.51) 
PD*Export  0.187      (2.59)  0.119      (1.41) 
PD*LaborConc.  0.424      (1.31)  0.608      (2.46) 
PD*Capital  0.218      (1.83)  0.048      (0.36) 
PD*Wage  0.052      (0.39)  0.060      (0.45) 
PD*Emp.  0.021      (0.46)  0.101      (3.41) 
PD*Time  -0.154     (-1.72)  -0.101     (-2.69) 
PD*Nonstate*Time  0.001      (0.03)  0.029      (1.95) 
PD*Conc.*Time  -0.059     (-1.46)  -0.078     (-2.75) 
PD*Export*Time  -0.042     (-2.38)  -0.018     (-1.18) 
PD*LaborConc.*Time  0.019      (0.19)  -0.011     (-0.22) 
PD*Capital*Time  -0.001     (-0.05)  0.006      (0.24) 
PD*Wage*Time  0.054      (1.58)  0.060      (2.53) 
PD*Emp.*Time  0.029      (2.31)  0.013      (2.50) 
Nonstate  -0.032     (-0.40)   
Conc.  0.594      (2.34)   
Export  -0.155     (-2.43)   
LaborConc.  -0.043     (-0.13)   
Capital  -0.330     (-2.75)   
Wage  0.321      (1.87)   
Emp.  0.093      (2.31)   
Nonstate*Time  -0.024     (-0.83)  -0.025      (-2.61) 
Conc.*Time  -0.193     (-2.64)  -0.203    (-12.26) 
Export*Time  0.038      (2.18)  0.041       (4.00) 
LaborConc.*Time  -0.002     (-0.01)  0.015       (0.56) 
Capital*Time  0.040      (1.02)  0.038       (2.38) 
Wage*Time  -0.045     (-0.89)  -0.046      (-2.82) 
Emp.*Time  -0.014     (-1.54)  -0.013      (-4.23) 
Time  0.120      (1.27)  0.113       (5.33) 
Constant  -0.594     (-1.86)  0.112       (7.33) 
R
2  0.041 0.080 
N 35,406  35,406 
Note:  t statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for firm clustering in the OLS specification. 
is the lagged difference in productivity between the firm and the average for the industry, twice lagged.  Time
time trend ranging from 0 in 1993 to 7 in 2000. 
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with productivity-enhancing reallocation, though this declined over time in the weighted 
fixed-effects regressions. Surprisingly, the results of the weighted regressions suggest that 
reallocation was more productivity enhancing in concentrated labor markets. 
Finally, the regressions also include capital intensity, wage, and employment size, 
variables which are frequently argued to represent greater firm-specific human capital.  How 
labor adjustment costs affect the employment share growth—productivity differential 
relationship will depend on the shape of the adjustment cost function, but one possibility is 
that those costs are lumpy, so that employment is adjusted only when some threshold of the 
deviation of optimal from actual employment is reached.
7  In this case, employment changes 
may be more closely associated with the firm’s productivity differential than they would be 
for firms with low adjustment costs, as the changes in the former case are no longer marginal 
decisions. 
The data appear to support this interpretation.  All three of these proxy variables—
capital intensity, average wage, and employment size—are estimated to increase the partial 
correlation of employment share growth with the firm’s relative productivity.  Only with 
respect to the average wage, however, is there strong evidence that this relationship has 
strengthened during the sample period.    
4. Conclusion 
As in other transition economies, job reallocation in Ukraine has increased 
considerably after a program of liberalization was begun.  By contrast with some other 
countries—Russia for instance—the Ukrainian increase appears to be slower, however, and 
the rise in the contribution of intrasectoral reallocation productivity appears to be smaller.  
The effects of privatization and product market competition are also somewhat different 
                                                 
7 Hamermesh (1993) presents evidence that plant-level employment adjustments tend to be highly 
concentrated, consistent with lumpy costs of adjustments.  26
compared to Russia:  both are associated with greater excess reallocation in Ukraine 
(although neither is in Russia), while privatization has an unclear effect and competition a 
positive effect on the productivity-reallocation relationship (both have positive effects in 
Russia). 
Ukraine’s transition policies have frequently been labeled “gradualist,” compared to 
Russia’s “shock therapy,” yet it is difficult to find much difference between the official 
macroeconomic performance records of the two countries.  The microeconomic evidence 
presented here, however, is consistent with the view that reforms have stimulated 
restructuring and reallocation in both countries, and that the employment reallocation has 
become productivity-enhancing.  These effects appear to have taken place more quickly and 
strongly in Russia than in Ukraine, implying that the pace of policy reforms may be reflected 
in microeconomic behavior. 
 
Data Appendix 
The firm panel data in this study are constructed from Derzhkomstat (State 
Committee for Statistics) industrial registries.  In 1992 and 2000 the registry covered 
approximately 94.1 and 85.2 percent of total industrial employment, respectively.  We restrict 
the analysis to continuing firms in manufacturing industries, with the exceptions of Table 4, 
where non-manufacturing industrial sectors (e.g., electricity, extraction, and industrial 
services) are included, and Table 7, where entering and exiting firms are taken into account. 
To eliminate implausible outliers, we excluded observations with large employment 
changes scaled by size as follows:  firms with below 50 employees in one year that grow to 
over 250 in the next, firms with between 50 and 199 employees that grow (calculated 
according to the Davis-Haltiwanger method
8) over 120 percent or under -170 percent, firm 
with employment between 200 and 499 growing more than 100 percent or under -150 
percent, and firms with employment of 500 or more growing more than 80 percent or under -
130 percent.  The labor productivity decompositions also exclude observations for firms in 
pairs of years where the absolute value of annual labor productivity growth, calculated using 
the Davis-Haltiwanger method, exceeds 1. 
 
Variable Definitions 
Capital is the rank order of firms by capital intensity, calculated by dividing average book 
value of fixed assets used in the main activity of the enterprise by employment for each year 
                                                 











1 2 .  27
in which both values exist in the database.  Firms are ranked by capital intensity in each year, 
an average of the yearly ranks is calculated for each firm, and finally the firms are ranked 
according to these yearly averages with the ranks expressed in a range from 0 to 1, where 1 is 
the most capital-intensive. 
Conc. is product market concentration in 1992, calculated as the regional Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index multiplied by region share plus the national Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
multiplied by one minus region share, where region share is the proportion of regions 
(oblasts) with at least one enterprise in the five-digit industry in 1992. 
Employment is the average number of personnel in industrial production divisions 
(including both production and non-production employees) in the year.  When used as a 
measure of size, employment is the natural log of the average of the firm’s employment in all 
non-missing years. 
Export is a dummy variable equal to one if the enterprise exported in 1998, 1999, or 2000 
(the years for which the registries have firm-level export information). 
LaborConc. is a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of industrial employment concentration in the 
county (raion) in 1993, calculated using the industrial registry. 
Labor Productivity is the natural log of output minus the natural log of employment. 
Output is the value of output produced, net of VAT and excise taxes.  For 1992–96, the data 
set contains real output for the current and previous year.  We use this when examining labor 
productivity growth over pairs of years during that time.  For 1996–2000, we deflated 
nominal output using the annual industry producer price index relative to 1990, as reported 
by Ukrainian Economic Trends.  When analyzing productivity growth over periods longer 
than one year, we deflated all nominal values by the industry producer price index. 
Wage is a ranking of average wage rates, calculated by dividing the total wage bill by the 
average industrial employment for each year in which both values exist in the database.   
Firms are ranked by average wage in each year, an average of the yearly ranks is calculated 
for each firm, and finally the firms are ranked according to these yearly averages with the 
ranks expressed in a range from 0 to 1, where 1 has the highest average wage.   28
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